Stephen Napier Ph.D.
About Stephen Napier
Associate professor of Philosophy, Villanova University
Dr. Stephen Napier is an associate professor of philosophy at Villanova University specializing in clinical bioethics, and epistemology (the study of knowledge). He has published two books, Virtue Epistemology: Motivation and Knowledge, and Uncertain Bioethics: Moral Risk and Human Dignity, as well as numerous peer-reviewed articles. He is working on a third manuscript tentatively titled, Justified Killing: Interests, Persons, and Epistemic Justification. He has been nominated for two teaching awards. In addition to his academic work, he has extensive clinical ethics experience having served both as a post-doctoral fellow at St. Thomas hospital and as a Human Protections Analyst at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital. During his graduate work, he served as an Advocate. He received his doctorate in philosophy from Saint Louis University. He can be reached at Stephen.napier@villanova.edu.
In this section you will find numerous compositions that extend the arguments outlined in Uncertain Bioethics.
Precis of Uncertain Bioethics - Extended
This is an extended summation of the argument and its context as discussed in my Uncertain Bioethics
On Constitutional Views
This is an assessment of Constitutional Views on personhood and supplements chapter 4.
Justification and the Underdetermination of no-person arguments
This is a copy of an article I published in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly in 2015.
Vulnerable embryos: Natural loss, and rescue cases
This is an article that addresses numerous arguments concerning the moral status of human embryos.
Consent and its Hurdles
This is a piece that addresses the empirical evidence for how and why consent is hard to achieve in research settings
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Virtue Epistemology
In this section you will find numerous works either in support of my earlier work, Virtue Epistemology: Motivation and knowledge, or works related to virtue epistemology in some way or other.
Virtue Epistemology
This is an introduction to my book
Reply to Baehr and Gowans
This is a reply to the critical evaluations of this work by Jason Baehr and Christopher Gowans.
Wisdom and Sensitivity
This is a paper which makes some observations about the issue of defining wisdom.
Philosophy of Religion
Lecture notes or Articles
Evil and Expanded versions of Theism
2002
The evidential problem of evil responds to skeptical theism by charging that skeptical theism must presuppose an expended version of theism (whole religious outlooks) and therefore, the apriori probability is so low on expanded views as to be inert. I respond to this argument
Public Writings
Reflections on being an Advocate
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